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Abstract
O¤shoring has lately received wide attention. Its potential e¤ects, mainly to be
materialized in employment and productivity dislocations, are yet to be fully assessed.
However, some consensus has been attained as to how to proxy its theoretical denition
at an aggregate level. Here we review the most conventional indices the economic
literature has so far produced, and employ them to provide an overview of the extent of
the phenomenon for a group of countries. Contrary to common beliefs, our data reveal
that o¤shoring is not exclusive of large developed economies. Further, we highlight
the continuing prominence of the manufacturing over the services sector, and observe
that while services o¤shoring is on the rise, it still represents a small fraction of total
o¤shoring.
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1 Introduction: Denitions and controversies
Recent times have been witness to a seemingly new and innovative way of doing business:
o¤shoring. Usually o¤shoring presents itself with some degree of outsourcing, so it is not
di¢ cult to nd real-life combinations of both business practices. Undeniably, all the media
noise that exists is constantly trying to set new trends around the subject and reshape the
way of doing business in general. Occasionally, it is even changing the way policy-makers
address the issue in fear of political backlash. News about millions of jobs moving abroad
can indistinctively cause alarms to go o¤ clamorously in the political arena, or the animal
spirits to start shaking the economy unnecessarily in the private sector. We have thus more
than a serious reason to believe that numbers and estimates are to be looked on with special
care. Indeed, with o¤shoring the observer can change the object he or she observes.1
Consequently, it is most important to measure o¤shoring properly, especially for what
it might represent for labor markets around the world. We are then interested in producing
several measures using di¤erent known indices at the country level for a signicant group
of countries, and for a recent period (1995-2005).
Yet new in its coinage, the truth is o¤shoring and its close cousin outsourcing have
for long been among us. In fact, they can be traced back to an idea widely used in eco-
nomics: comparative advantages. If we dene o¤shoring merely as job relocation outside
the national boundaries in search of lower wages, we can see how this comes eventually
to exploiting comparative advantages through cheaper labor force and cost savings. More
precisely, o¤shoring refers to the geographic location where the service or production takes
place, whereas outsourcing responds to the ownership of the means of production (in-house
or third-party). In this way we come to be familiar with such terms as "o¤shore outsourc-
ing" (or international outsourcing) and "in-house o¤shoring". These can also be referred to
as o¤shoring in the broad and narrow sense, respectively.
As policy-makers, if we were left to decide whether our national production should
be carried out abroad while local workers move to the pool of unemployed, we might as
well think twice. However, if we were to foresee increases in domestic productivity due
to o¤shoring-related activities, we might face a more hopeful scenario instead. Indeed,
productivity gains for those companies engaged in any form of o¤shoring could translate into
price discounts and a boost in their product demands, thus a¤ecting employment positively.
But how long would it take for the companies to seize the benets, if any? And more, would
an early setback predispose people in general to see o¤shoring as a real threat?
Noticeably, the productivity and employment e¤ects of o¤shoring have so far occupied
most of the economics literature. On both these e¤ects empirical works have successively
1Interestingly, Von Mises and the Austrian scholars would say the economic discipline is in general subject
to this fallacy. Humans are too complex and far self-conscious not to have their behavior changed to some
degree by the very act of observation.
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failed in providing with denite and unambiguous answers. Even though the subject in
general remains unsettled, some consensus has at least been reached when it comes to
measuring o¤shoring to a certain level of aggregation. This is no easy task as we will show
later.
We therefore address di¤erent questions that have been somehow covered by the liter-
ature. We rst wonder about the relation between o¤shoring and country size. Are larger
countries the bigger o¤shorers? Do they show a signicant tendency towards this practice,
globally? News reports put the stress on large developed economies like the US, and the huge
amount of workers soon to become unemployed. But are these numbers really important
for such countries? Apparently not, and more, relatively small countries nd themselves
among the bigger o¤shorers worldwide.2 Further, what is the importance of o¤shoring de-
pending on the economic sector? Are manufacturing industries more prone to go o¤shore
than their services counterparts? This is very much related to the next question: what are
the intensities of both materials and services o¤shoring? Has the rst wave of production
(materials) o¤shoring abated, just to make room for a second wave of services o¤shoring?
The numbers do not seem to say so, at least for the moment. Even though growth rates
in services o¤shoring are much larger than those of materials during the period 1995-2005,
their levels are still far below of what one would judge as signicant.
Here we set ourselves to the endeavor of bringing out to light a review about the most
utilized indices in the literature, and their application to aggregate (country) data. The
outline of the paper goes as follows: section 2 deals with the problems of measurement and
describes a series of widely used indices; section 3 displays the statistical data on o¤shoring
worldwide, making use of the indices and stressing the di¤erence between industries (man-
ufacturing or services) and between forms of o¤shoring (materials or services); section 4
concludes.
2 Measurement
How then to dene o¤shoring when it comes to empirics? In other words, how to proxy
its theoretical denition quantitatively? Roughly speaking, o¤shoring can be measured
either directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, the lack of reliable o¢ cial records should make
us consider indirect measures to a greater extent. Similarly, given the research objective
and the data constraints we might want to look at country, industry, rm, plant, or even
individual worker level data.3
2Amiti and Wei (2005) develop a similar comparative study, covering a large group of countries but
using trade data from the balance of payments instead of the o¤shoring indices discussed below. We use
the OECD I-O database to extract these indices at the country level.
3It is to remark that when analyzing employment, for instance, we should expect a somehow washed
out e¤ect as we consider higher levels of aggregation. Conversely, the more in detail we look the more that
o¤shoring would be signicantly related to employment, at least in the short run.
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2.1 A word about data quality
In this modern age of ultrafast communications words often lose their meanings and numbers
can go wrongly interpreted. A pernicious yet natural side e¤ect of globalization, it compels
us to seek further into the available data and get a clearer picture of the phenomenon. Raw
data are sometimes not easily accessible, and the little we may get usually hides certain
relevant facts. Before going over the di¤erent kinds of measures that could better proxy
o¤shoring through indirect indicators, we should mention the sources and their reliability.
Kirkegaard (2007) breaks down the sources into three empirical hierarchies. The lowest
tier encompasses all the estimations and projections by consulting companies. These reports
(Forrester, 2004, and McKinsey, 2003, for instance) seek to set up new trends thanks to their
continuous feedback with the private sector, yet turn out wanting in their methodology and
of limited scope most of times. Selection bias in the interviews conducted, and thus lack of
representation of the small samples produced, are commonplace in these studies. A notable
example is that by Forrester Research (2004), which forecasts the grandiloquent gure of
3.3 millions of US jobs to move abroad by the year 2015. But this is peanuts if compared
with the 160 millions of jobs projected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the same year,
and the 35 million already created during the last decade in the US labor market.
Second-class data belong to the estimates elaborated by the press, mostly resorting
to public and veriable sources. Once all is settled and ready to go companies normally
announce it publicly as part of their marketing campaign. However, in later times and
because of a higher negative reception that makes o¤shoring a synonymous of job loss,
companies feel more reluctant to publicize job shifts to foreign countries. Related to this,
politiciansattention also dims in close connection to the electoral cycle. Mankiw and Swagel
(2006) unearth a clear pattern of the ups and downs of o¤shoring and outsourcing in the
four major US newspapers (Fig. 1, p. 1030). Seemingly, interest awoke sharply before the
2004 election, just to go back to previous levels right afterwards. All in all, yet not perfect,
press releases make up a more objective group in this data hierarchy. The report presented
by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2004)
is a good example.
Finally, the series of indirect measures we discuss below place at the top of this ranking.
As shown there, o¢ cial country records and international organizations of renown like the
IMF or the OECD, all supply the raw data needed to develop a reliable indirect measure
of o¤shoring. Although the academic research so far lags behind that presented by the
other two sources, recent times have shown to be fairly productive and with many research
possibilities.
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2.2 Aggregate indirect indicators
Before jumping into the indirect indicators, a comment on measuring o¤shoring directly
need be made. Gauging o¤shoring directly proves to be a hard task to take on, if not
impossible. Just to imagine what it would take to come up with a direct and comparable
index for all industries (not to mention all rms) conveys the feeling of an enterprise which
is hopeless from the outset. The scarce o¢ cial data and the ambiguous understanding of
the subject pose the principal obstacles. The OECD exhaustive report (2007) lists most of
the known measures, direct and indirect, yet as we will see the latter turn out more suitable
(or feasible) for research purposes.
Proposed direct indicators of o¤shoring, either in its broad or narrow denition (and
equally valid for production of goods and services), deal chiey with data on production,
number of employees, FDI, exports, and imports. The point is to make out the changes in
any of these variables due to relocation of workers. We should keep in mind that creating
new foreign jobs alone without reducing the domestic activity does not represent o¤shoring
or outsourcing. Likewise, a job lost because of domestic outsourcing is necessarily gained in
another sector of the domestic economy and, therefore, not part of the denition. This same
report goes over a vast catalog of drawbacks in using direct measures to assess the impact
on the labor markets. Apart from the fact that some data might overlook drops in the
number of jobs accountable to o¤shoring, other important limitations do exist. According
to the OECD, some of these might be: changes in the classication of rms, problems
of condentiality, subcontractors gone abroad with their clients, and successive small-scale
relocations.
Now we move on to examine the main indirect indicators proposed in the literature. An
important decision the researcher so often faces is that of choosing the aggregation of the
study. This is a bit arbitrary since the more in detail we go the more we would expect, for
example, to nd a negative relation between employment and o¤shoring in the short run.4
Further, more aggregate gures could hide certain industries or companies which show a
higher inclination to o¤shore. These are commonly referred to as aggregation and sector
bias, respectively. On the other hand, when looking at rm or establishment data it is
important not to lose sight of the ownership status. We can see how, especially at this level,
o¤shoring measures abound and are not that homogeneous.
Perhaps more than in other empirical ventures, data availability here poses a serious
drawback. Especially if the goal is an international comparison of the reach of o¤shoring,
then the homogeneity of the data remains of most importance. Therefore, we next consider
the industry level measures, which can be easily aggregated to the national level. These
4This need not be so all times. Several factors can inuence the nal e¤ect on employment as to make
it positive (type of o¤shoring, sector to which the rm belongs, etc.). Notwithstanding its importance, this
particular issue escapes the scope of the present work.
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industry measures have been conceived in the rst place, and somehow have set a trend in
the recent literature.
A benchmark contribution is Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b, 1997, and 1999).
There, o¤shoring is dened as the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase
of nonenergy inputs. They combine US import data from the four-digit SIC (Standard
Industrial Classication) with data on material purchases from the Census of Manufactures.
The census data crisscross the trade between industries of the same level and provides the
base for estimating the share of intermediate inputs in every industry. For a given industry,
multiplying its input purchases from each supplier industry times the ratio of imports to total
consumption in the supplier industry, and then adding over, turns out in their o¤shoring
measure. More formally, it can be written as follows:
OIit =
nP
j

Ijt
Qt
i
Mjt
Djt

(1)
where Ij is purchases of (material) inputs j by industry i, Q is total inputs (excluding energy)
used by i, Mj is total imports of goods j, and Dj their domestic demands. Here, domestic
demand (or the consumption of goods and services j) can be measured as shipments +
imports - exports, removing the trouble of developing a deator for the value added. This
formula provides an index of the o¤shoring intensity at the industry level. It proxies the
import content of intermediate trade of industries which, in turn, proxies their o¤shoring
intensity. Specically, the rst term in (1) stems from the census data (or input-output
tables), while the second term, which is an economy-wide import share, is obtained from
the trade data.
Conveniently, this expression serves as a measure for both the traditional o¤shoring of
materials and the more fashionable o¤shoring of services, yet former works have conned
their analysis to materials alone. Besides, it is useful to split o¤shoring into its narrow and
broad measures. The narrow measure restricts to imported intermediate inputs from the
same two-digit industry whereas the broad measure includes all other industries as well.
Also the di¤erence between the broad and narrow measures, which represents all imported
intermediate inputs from outside the two-digit purchasing industry, appears as an alternative
when it comes to capturing the true nature of o¤shoring.
Importing trade stands for an important amount of intra and interrm trade nowadays.
It is then a fair proxy of o¤shoring while data are relatively easy to nd. However, a common
drawback to all measures relying on imports and import shares is that o¤shoring does not
necessarily imply an increase of imports, or vice versa. In e¤ect, if a local exporting rm
decides to move part of its production abroad and continues exporting it from a foreign
country this would not translate into a drop in imports to the parent rm. Rather, it would
represent a fall of its exports. Also, a rise in a countrys imports due to more favorable
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terms of trade should not be linked to an expansion of o¤shoring from local rms. Hence, it
is the composition of trade and the share of intermediate inputs in particular, what matters
in the end for such economic aggregates as wages and employment. Convincingly, "trade in
intermediate inputs can have an impact on wages and employment that is much greater than
for trade in nal consumer goods" (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001, p.1). Remarkably, many
of the latest Heckscher-Ohlin-type trade models with a positive welfare e¤ect of o¤shoring
(yet ambiguous e¤ects on factor prices) take Feenstra and Hansons analysis as a starting
point.5 ;6
Campa and Goldberg (1997) put yet another spin to the story. They dene an index
of "vertical specialization" for several countries, underpinning the share of imported inputs
embodied in production, but now remarking the increasing verticality in international trade.
Through this they try to assess the extent to which multiple stages are traded for di¤erent
products, using input-output tables that include sector-level data.
V S1it =
nP
j
mjt (pjt qjt)
i
Y it
(2a)
with mj being equal to the share of imports in consumption of industry j, pj qj the value
of inputs from industry j used in the production of industry i, and Y the value of total
production of industry i.
Hummels et al. (2001) further develop the measure of vertical specialization just to
account for the imported input content of exports at a country level, using the OECD input-
output database for a sample of several countries. A clear interpretation of the concept of
vertical specialization is provided in gure 1, p. 26, of their paper. Moreover, they employ for
the rst time the imported intermediates to be found in input-output tables, thus avoiding
the estimation of the imports content of inputs (as in Feenstra and Hanson). This is what
we do in our analysis below.
These authors conceive their denition as imported inputs used only to elaborate prod-
ucts to be exported afterwards, which is tantamount to say "the foreign value-added em-
bodied in exports". A modied formula for the industry level would be then:
V S2it =
nP
j

mjt
Yt
i
Xjt (2b)
where mj represents imported inputs j by industry i, Y is the gross output of industry i,
and Xj are total exports of goods and services j. So if industry i uses no imported inputs or
if it does not export its output, V S2i = 0. Moreover, since the composition of trade is what
5For an analysis of Heckscher-Ohlin models see Arndt (1997), Deardor¤ (1998, 2001), Egger (2002),
Jones (2000), Jones and Kierkowski (1990, 2001), and Kohler (2004).
6In particular, Feenstra and Hanson claim that wage di¤erentials might come after a "factor-biased
technological change" has taken place. Other views hold sector-bias as the driving force behind the wage
di¤erentials (see here Arndt, 1997, 1998, 1999).
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matters, in the aggregate the expression is normalized by total exports. As customary in the
formulation of these measures, the authors make use of input-output tables distinguishing
foreign and domestic sources, value-added, gross output, and exports. An extended version
of V S2 would also include imported inputs used indirectly in the production of goods and
services, as in V S1.
Another group of indices brings out the participation of imported inputs in total pro-
duction. An example is the narrow measure by Egger and Egger (2003), which includes only
intermediate goods imported from abroad and produced by the same industry classication
back in the home country. They construct a measure of o¤shoring or "foreign outsourcing"
from Austria to Eastern Europe, employing Austrian input-output matrices:
OIit =
 
Zit
|{z}

Mworldt
Yt
i
| {z }

MEEt
Mworldt
i
| {z } (3)
A B C
where A is the total volume of national and international outsourcing of industry i, and
both B and C appear as weighting terms for A. More precisely, A is the intraindustry trade
in intermediate goods and services either from domestic or foreign suppliers. Meanwhile,
B represents the imports openness of industry i while C stands for the share of imports
from Easter European countries in overall imports. The "cross-border outsourcing" variable
(OIit) is then expressed as a ratio to the gross production of industry i, and not to total
inputs purchased by industry as in Feenstra and Hanson.
To summarize, a clear-cut classication of o¤shoring indices into three categories could
be the following: those considering the share of imported inputs in total inputs, those high-
lighting vertical specialization, and those considering the share of imported inputs in gross
output. All these measures are usually estimated at certain level of aggregation (country or
industry),7 yet the literature has recently taken a widespread plunge into disaggregate data
that takes the analysis away from input-output tables. Of course, it is to expect that future
research around these measures will be more dehomogenized, as a result of an increasing
share of studies being conducted at a rather disaggregate level.
Examples of these three indices are, respectively, equations (1), (2), and (3) above.
Broadly speaking, all existing measures at the industry level would fall to some extent into
one of the three groups mentioned. Horgos (2008) considers two additional measures that
we do not reproduce here: indices considering imported inputs in total imports, and those
considering the value added in production. He shows how, for Germany, these two perform
rather poorly in a comparative study that takes all ve types of indices. We undertake a
similar decomposition analysis below to gauge the suitability of the proposed indices for our
7In order to aggregate to the country from the industry level, it is necessary to weight by industry output
and then add over all the industries(weighted) indices. This task we undertake below, in the next section.
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country data.
In their simplest expressions, and upon availability of intermediate inputs data, equations
(1) and (3) can easily be reduced to:
(a) OIQit =
nP
j

mjt
Qt
i
and (b) OIYit =
nP
j

mjt
Yt
i
(4)
where OIQit and OI
Y
it are the o¤shoring intensity indices expressed as ratios in terms of total
purchases of intermediate nonenergy inputs and total production. In particular, when i = j
they become the narrow measures, and the numerator in (4) is simply the diagonal element
of the import-use matrix.
Most of times it is not possible to use such simple expressions as in (4) in an extensive
time period. Input-output tables are periodically published around every ve years and
remain one of the few direct sources for m (imported intermediate inputs) so far. That is
why the numerator in (4) is usually estimated through trade data, as in (1) and (3). Despite
this empirical shortcoming, we rely exclusively on variations of formula 4 to come up with
our statistical analysis.
3 Statistical analysis: A world overview
We present country evidence from calculations based on the indices reviewed above, using the
OECD input-output tables for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 (the latest tables available).
As stated before, aggregate gures could hide industries or companies showing a higher
propensity to o¤shore. We are aware that this further aggregation (from the industry to
the country level) entails a higher degree of potential bias, but our aim is to produce indices
that are at the same time good proxies and comparable among countries. Since our main
concern centers on o¤shoring, we should be noting that the subject of inshoring, that is,
foreign rms relocating subsidiaries domestically, is left out of the present study (see here
Amiti and Wei, 2005). Thus, we turn to answer several empirical questions.
The rst step is to see if some pattern emerges as regards o¤shoring and countriesrelative
sizes, as done previously by Hummels et al. (2001) and Amiti and Wei (2005). At rst we
would suspect industries in larger and more industrialized economies to be relatively more
prone to go o¤shore. However, as found in both mentioned references, here too o¤shoring
intensity (as proxied by relative trade in intermediate goods) turns out inversely related to
country size.
Distinguishing the extent to which manufacturing and services industries engage in o¤-
shoring with a di¤erent intensity proves also of interest. Traditionally, rms belonging to
the manufacturing sector have been more inclined to o¤shoring due to the kind of activities
they mostly undertake (e.g. manufacture-related activities which were initially easier to
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move abroad).
Another step towards a further understanding of the phenomenon is the separation
between materials and services o¤shoring. This connects directly with the previous point,
and the evidence so far suggests that services o¤shoring, yet growing exponentially, is still
on its rst stages. This we corroborate below.
We analyze the evidence for these three empirical questions in the following sections.
Additionally, we take a deeper look into services o¤shoring as it has been argued to be the
ultimate manifestation of modern trade (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). Finally, we provide a
decomposition analysis that intends to compare the performance of the di¤erent indices.
3.1 O¤shoring intensity and country size
We construct a ranking for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005, for a wide sample of countries, on
which input-output tables from the OECD are available (tables A1 to A6). Three indices are
reported, as dened earlier: imported inputs in total inputs, imported inputs in gross output,
and a measure of vertical specialization.8 The narrow measure considers only international
trade among industries of the same classication as a proxy of in-house o¤shoring. This
corresponds to the diagonal in the import use matrix. The broad measure stands in turn
for all trade, intra and inter-industry and, thus, for a rough proxy of o¤shore outsourcing
or international outsourcing. It is usually believed that the former better captures the
general idea about o¤shoring, yet the literature has reached no denite answer on this
point. Needless to say that the broad measure is, by denition, always bigger than the
narrow one, since the numerator of the index is always bigger for the former.
As seen in these tables, smaller economies (e.g. in GDP terms) rank among the rst ten
according to the three indices, narrow and broad. This really comes as no surprise, since all
these indices belong to the series of openness measures well known in economics, where larger
countries display in general smaller indices. This is naturally so because larger economies
produce a greater amount of inputs than smaller ones, thus curbing the relative extent
to which the former are engaged in international trade. Therefore, smaller countries rely
more strongly on o¤shoring as a form of international trade than their larger counterparts,
in relative values. Countries like Luxemburg, Ireland, Hungary, Taiwan, Austria, Slovak
Republic, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia are some ne examples. On the other
hand, some of the larger economies perform consistently at the bottom; namely, the US,
Japan, China, India, and Brazil. Right in the middle of this ladder we nd a varied group
of large countries among which Germany, Canada and Spain stand out. It is also possible
8The vertical specialization index by Hummels et al. (2001) turns out signicantly higher than those
presented here, in spite of both being calculated from the same source (OECD), yet for slightly di¤erent
years. The di¤erence is that their index is weighted by merchandise exports alone, and ours is weighted by
total exports.
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to identify Italy and the UK swinging around the average for all three indices.9
Changes in the rankings are of little signicance, either among indices or when moving
from narrow to broad measures. This is not that much the case when we analyze the change,
in relative terms, which took place from 1995 to 2005 (tables A7 to A9). A few of the larger
economies now show themselves as having undergone a steep expansion of o¤shoring during
that recent period, like in the US, Spain (only for 1995-2000), and Germany. Surprisingly,
China, Brazil, and Japan portray a signicant positive change during the period 2000-2005.
We can see how, incidentally, the pattern shown by these latter countries coincides with a
signicant liberalization of their trade in recent times, most importantly for China.
It would not be reasonable however to try recognize a trend for the countries of the
sample, since we only have data for three points in time. Despite the gained prominence
in latest years, such larger economies as the US, China, Brazil, India, or Japan, are still
far from compromising important shares of their intermediate trade to foreign sources (e.g.
o¤shoring). Remarkably, though, Canada, Germany and Spain stand perceptibly aside.10
The reason for this performance on these three countries remains veiled to us, yet we may
venture a logical explanation. In all cases the country of origin (or source country) is
right at the border of a vast and open market which is, either very close geographically,
or culturally, or both. A trading partnership between Canada and the US dates back to
the rst days when both nations were born. One should presume that Canadian and US
rms are easily relocating across the border, yet as it turns out it seems relatively more
signicant for Canada. Similarly, Germany and Spain nd unbeatable opportunities in
Eastern Europe and Northern Africa, respectively. More, one is not to forget about the
tremendous business opportunities that Latin American countries o¤er to Spanish rms.
Yet not sharing the same border, both territories do share a cultural background that for
times allows a better entrepreneurial understanding.11
Generally speaking, we can see how global o¤shoring (the world weighted average) grew
remarkably during the period 1995-2000 for any measure considered, yet less dramatically
for the period 2000-2005. This loss of momentum was more strongly perceived among
narrow measures (e.g. in-house o¤shoring), perhaps as a result of entrepreneurs being now
more condent on working with specialized third-party providers. As we dened o¤shoring,
9Remember that all these indices are constructed assuming that both the values of the numerator and
denominator refer to the same price level, thus avoiding the use of di¤erent price indices.
10The gures for Germany are very similar to those in Horgos (2008), who relies on German data alone,
taken from the German Socio Economic Panel. For instance, his broad measure for 1995 and 2000, when
weighting for total inputs, stands at 15 and 19 percent respectively. When weighting for output these indices
are 6 and 8 percent. Our data shows the following: 14 and 18 percent (table A2), and 7 and 10 percent
(table A4). Furthermore, growth rates in his data and ours are also alike.
11The weighted (world) means were calculated using the 2008 nominal GDP (US dollars) from the IMF
database (2009). Remember that, previously, in order to come up with the indices for every country these
had to be weighted according to the type of index, as dened at the bottom of the tables A1 to A6. See
how the weighted mean is always lower than the mean, thus implying that larger economies tend to gather
at the lower end of the ranking.
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its recent upward trend should not be surprising, since trade is an ever-growing result
of globalization and capitalism. All in all, o¤shoring appears as the natural outcome of
international trade on which smaller countries seem to rely relatively more often, in order
to survive and integrate into the world economy.
3.2 O¤shoring intensity and economic sector
Here we would like to approach an answer to the following question: which economic sector
(and by extension, what kind of rms) o¤shores the most? What we do again is sorting
out the sample of countries for the same years as before, but now doing specic mention
to two separate economic sectors. In particular, for every country we divide the whole set
of industries of the OECD I-O database into manufacturing and services industries.12 We
resort to the same three aggregate indices, both in their narrow and broad versions, to
account for this description.
We discover that the manufacturing industries are more heavily engaged in o¤shoring
activities than the services industries (tables A10 and A11); the sample (weighted) mean
gives us a clue. For some countries the di¤erence is rather important as to make the
services sector look like it does not engage in international trade at all. This is more easily
seen for the narrow measure. For example, in Argentina, China, Greece, and the US, the
o¤shoring intensity of the manufacturing sector is, in general, overwhelmingly superior to
that of the services sector. When considering the broad measure the picture is now fairly
homogeneous, with the intensity in manufacturing industries only doubling or tripling that
of services industries, for the whole sample.
A reasonable explanation for this gap is that the services sector still lags behind (e.g.
the three-sector hypothesis) in developing a proper infrastructure or the particular know-
how, as it has for long being the case in the manufacturing industries. This sounds odd
for developed economies with mature high-tech industries and a strong investment in R&D,
but there, too, the growing services sector commits a tiny share of its intermediate trade to
international providers. We must also not forget that most services have other services as
their intermediates, and services are in general far less tradable than goods. Therefore, all
three indices underlie the so-far less relevant importance of o¤shoring for services industries,
something that holds true for both the narrow and broad measures. Nevertheless, as men-
tioned earlier, there are still a great number of potentially o¤shoreable services that might
eventually account for larger gures. But when will this take place we cannot say.
As for the countriesrelative size, the same pattern emerges here as before, yet it turns
out less evident in the manufacturing sector. Small economies stand at the top in both the
manufacturing and services sectors, and for both the narrow and broad measures. Also,
12This is done following the classication by the ISIC (rev. 3) or its equivalent in the OECD itself. See
the reference provided in table A10.
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several of the fully developed economies now appear among the most intensive "o¤shorers"
in this more in detail breakdown. It is worth mentioning Canada, Belgium, Austria, the
Netherlands, and the Nordics for the manufacturing sector in both the narrow and broad
measures. In turn, for the services sector, narrow measure, we should mention the same
group but adding Germany, whereas for the broad measure the display is now less disperse.
Among the larger economies we should point out how rather disappointingly turn out some
of the performances, namely: the US, Japan, China, Brazil, and India. Their indices are
way below the average.
If we look at the sample mean it is easy to recognize a positive change from 1995 to
2005, for all the measures considered. The short span of time for which we can produce the
series of indices should prevent us to make any further consideration on the evolution of
the phenomenon. Enough to say that, with the exception of some outlier, the presence of
o¤shoring is consistently and signicantly more important in the manufacturing than in the
services sector. As we shall see below, this di¤erentiation between sectors is tightly related
with the classication of materials versus services o¤shoring. Naturally, manufacturing
industries have occupied themselves more with materials o¤shoring, while services industries
have followed suit with services o¤shoring. Here it is the "use" of the input we are interested
in, as opposed to the "origin" of the input, which is what we study in the next section.
3.3 Materials versus services o¤shoring
The di¤erentiation between materials and services o¤shoring has not attracted the econo-
mists attention until very recently. Here we refer to the type of activities or functions
o¤shored instead of the economic sector where these practices originate. Seemingly, services
o¤shoring should be qualitatively di¤erent due to the relative impracticability it faced in
the past. This was the outcome of, rst, the lack of mobility of the resources involved, and
later, the fear for the potential loss of control of the implementations relocated abroad. But
new communication technologies (specially the Internet) are boosting a whole new way of
doing business and thus using the available resources more e¢ ciently. Right now, white-
collar workers do not seem particularly condent about the former impracticability of a
prospective relocation of their jobs.
We present similar indices to those used earlier, but now calculating the import pene-
tration in production of two types of inputs: materials and services. This is done according
to the classication of industries but now applied to the foreign industry where the input
was produced. In particular, grouping all input contributions by foreign manufacturing in-
dustries to a domestic industry gives the material o¤shoring index for that industry. After
weighting for each industrys output we have the countrys index of materials o¤shoring.
In the same manner, grouping all the foreign contributions in services provides the services
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o¤shoring index which, after weighting, becomes the countrys services o¤shoring index.13
It is clear that services o¤shoring still represents, with a very few exceptions, a small share
of intermediate trade for a vast majority of countries (table A12). Again, country size (in
GDP terms) appears as a determinant of o¤shoring intensity according to the di¤erentiation
between materials and services. As for materials o¤shoring we do not see a large dispersion
of the indices. As for services, smaller countries like Luxemburg and Ireland take the lead,
followed by far by the Slovak and Czech Republics, Estonia and Hungary, among the lesser
developed, and Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and the Nordic countries, among
the more developed ones. On the other end, the US and China call the attention for the
little relative weight that services o¤shoring signies for the total economy.
As argued in the previous section, we should not be surprised about these numbers, since
it is to expect that each sector of the economy would focus more intensively on o¤shoring
of related activities. Despite the relative lack of signicance of services o¤shoring, we must
point out the potential impact it could have in the longer run. The larger positive change
of the world (weighted) average proves the increasing importance of these practices usually
associated with higher value added activities.14 Most of the countries experienced a real
upgrade in this sense, independently of their level of development. Also, for some countries
it is possible to observe that the rise in services was accompanied by a fall of materials
o¤shoring (Luxemburg, Ireland, the Netherlands, among others).
As discussed earlier, as better and faster communications make their way in the global-
ized world economy, a growing number of jobs becomes o¤shoreable overnight. Every task
that could be put through a wire is now at risk of being moved abroad in search of compar-
ative relative advantages. For this reason, it is of major importance to look deeper into this
kind of o¤shoring which might be determinant for so many workers and their families. The
future might otherwise be giving us an unpleasant surprise, perhaps sooner than expected.
3.4 Services o¤shoring: Impending revolution?
If services o¤shoring really holds the key, we should be looking more seriously at the indus-
tries contributing the most during the past few years. Presumably, services o¤shoring entails
higher value added activities, and thus, a greater potential for growth. We can expect that,
a priori, services o¤shoring should be concentrated on industries belonging to the services
sector. This is in fact what we observe for years 1995 and 2000 (see table A13).
The services o¤shoring indices for each industry are presented as the weighted mean taken
13To our knowledge this specic index was rst introduced by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006). We are unable
to produce a narrow measure since we do need to account for the origin of the inputs in several foreign
industries, either in the manufacturing or the services ones. The index reported in table A12 is therefore a
broad measure of the Feenstra and Hanson type, meaning that it is not restricted to trade between rms of
the same industry classication.
14Canals (2006) nds a similar pattern for services o¤shoring for the US.
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among all the countries of the sample, thus providing an approximation to the phenomenon
at the industry level worldwide. So if a revolution, whatever its extent, is to be expected, it
will have to take place most certainly in the services sector. See how especially important
turn out all the transport-related industries, followed by nance and insurance, post and
telecommunications, computer services, and other business activities.
To check on the possible e¤ect of this new prominence of services o¤shoring on the in-
dustries considered, we look at the associated rates of employment growth in the period
1995-2000 (table A14). In doing this, we combine the OECD I-O data with the STAN
(structural analysis) database, also from the OECD, and obtain a restricted sample.15 Be-
cause of this, we should be careful in drawing comparisons between tables A13 and A14. For
whereas the former tries to stress the major role of services o¤shoring in services industries
as a worldwide phenomenon, the latter speculates about a possible pattern between the
international growth rates of services o¤shoring and employment.
Seemingly, the growth in services o¤shoring related positively to the growth in employ-
ment during the period 1995-2000. This is far evident in gure A1 (the counterpart of
table A14), where we present the scatter plot and take the liberty to draw a regression line.
Convincingly, ve years appear as a reasonable time to capitalize the employment benets.
However, we ought to be a bit cautious about this. First, we only consider a limited sample
on which data were available; therefore, we should cast some doubt on the representativity of
the sample. Second, even though we weight the change in the industry means worldwide by
the countriesoutputs, these gures might yet hide some rather disparate data. And third,
high aggregation of the industrial classication, as argued before, might as well obscure the
picture even more.
The little evidence we air in this section is by no means an irrefutable proof of services
o¤shoring to translate into employment gains in the midterm. We can risk, however, that
this new wave of o¤shoring implying higher value added activities does not pose an imme-
diate and severe threat in terms of job losses. We should now go over the assessment of the
indices studied up to this point so we can decide which one behaves best.16
3.5 The quality of the indices
We now carry out a decomposition analysis over time (1995-2005) and across countries of the
indices so far studied and for both the narrow and broad measures. This analysis involves
following the conventional "within" and "between" exercise to account for variations in,
15The countries for which the data were available from both databases were: Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the US. This is nearly as half as what we had previously.
16In tables A12 to A14 and in gure 1 we have already made up our minds and picked out the formula
in (4a), that is, the index which makes reference to imported inputs in total inputs. In the next section we
see how this index performs reasonably well.
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respectively, industrieso¤shoring intensity and their shares in total production.17 What we
set out to do is a decomposition of the variance of the di¤erent indices: imported inputs in
total inputs (MII), imported inputs in gross output (MIO), and the vertical specialization
index (VS). Through this we should be able to isolate the changes in the o¤shoring intensities
within industries from the changes in their production shares.
Therefore, to see to what extent the indices describe the phenomenon accurately, we
proceed to extract the sources of growth behind all three indices making use of the data in
tables A1 to A6 and the following expression:
 = 
nP
i
ii =
nP
i
ii +
nP
i
ii ;  =MII;MIO; V S (5)
where the change in the o¤shoring index of countries () is decomposed, throughout indus-
tries (i), into the change in the o¤shoring intensity (the within term) and the change in the
share of total production (the between term). The former xes the structural component of
industries, also the share of industry output to total output (),18 to focus on the change in
the o¤shoring intensity (). The latter, contrariwise, xes the o¤shoring component, thus
capturing the contribution of the structural component to the change in the index.19
Tables A15 to A17 display the results of the decomposition analysis. The within term
corresponds to the rst right-hand term in (5) and the rst column in the tables. The
between term is, in turn, the second right-hand term in (5) and the second column in the
tables. The overall change in the indices () is presented in the column labeled as "total",
and is equal to the sum of the within and between terms, as shown in (5). The overall change
here coincides with the change, in percentage points, in the indices in tables A1 to A6. For
example, let us consider the changes in the MII index for the US during 1995-2005 (tables
A1 and A2, narrow and broad measures respectively). These changes amount to 0.34 (the
di¤erence in table A1) and 3.02 (the di¤erence in table A2) percentage points, which are
the values we obtain in the column "total" of table A15. The same applies to the other two
indices. For the US the values are: 0.22 (table A3) and 1.66 (table A4) for the MIO index,
both to be found in table A16; and 0.91 (table A5) and 2.51 (table A6) for the VS index,
to be found in table A17.
Finally, the last column in these tables is the "within to total" ratio, and gives us an idea
of how accurate the indices turn out to be. The closer it gets to 100 percent, the more the
change in the index is purely explained by o¤shoring. For all of them the broad specication
performs indeed more accurately when considering the global average, that is, after taking
17See Hummels et al. (2001), Strauss-Kahn (2004), and Horgos (2008), who also undertake decomposition
analyses along these lines.
18Output refers here to gross output, as often found in the literature for this kind of analysis (see Horgos,
2008, for instance). Moreover, for the vertical specialization index the structural component is di¤erent:
the share of the industrys exports in total exports.
19A bar over the variable denes the mean for the period under study.
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out possible outliers. We should however remain wary about these numbers since they are
just rough averages, with the sole purpose of providing an intuitive understanding of the
accuracy of the indices.
4 Concluding comments
O¤shoring as a relative new phenomenon is not just some food for the media. Rather, it
is a manifestation of the increased mobility of production factors and a reinterpretation of
the concept of comparative advantages. Numbers on the subject abound, but most of times
they are mindlessly brought onto the debate as though wanting to stir feelings of uneasiness
among the audience. The predictions tend to be much the same: bad omens loom in a
future not so far away. The truth is, however, that a consensus on what these numbers
really mean has not yet been reached.
In the economics literature, at least, it has become usual to consider the intermediate
trade as a ways of approaching a more rigorous denition. In fact, this sort of trade amounts
to an important share of the current total trade for industries, to the point of a¤ecting the
relative demand for di¤erent kinds of labor more than the trade in nal goods. This, for some
(Feenstra and Hanson, most representatively), becomes a factor-bias technological change
since it favors skilled employment over unskilled employment. With this as a background
we have rst reviewed the most common indices in the specialized literature, pointing out
the exhaustiveness shared by all of them. Then we have used these same indices to produce
a snapshot of the phenomenon worldwide during 1995-2005, at a country level.
Our empirical analysis throws some light on widely held preconceptions. First, o¤shoring
is not all about large and highly developed economies relocating jobs in far-o¤ countries.
Despite the fears held by many in these large and inuential economies, the evidence suggests
that o¤shoring is a widespread phenomenon. Furthermore, according to all our indices,
smaller economies rank consistently among the most intensive o¤shorers, in relative terms
(tables A1 to A6). This is in part as a result of our proxying o¤shoring through intermediate
trade. The growth rates show however a signicant increment during 1995-2000 for some
large economies (tables A7 to A9).
A second matter we address in the paper has to do with the di¤erence in magnitude for
two broad sectors of the economy: manufacturing and services. The numbers here make it
clear that o¤shoring still holds a stronger grip in manufacturing industries. A rst wave
certainly took place in the manufacturing sector worldwide back in the 1960s and 1970s when
it became necessary to compete with foreign producers. Moving production workers abroad
was then possible as well as needed. But with the further improvement of communications
and the birth of the Internet, a second wave of o¤shoring focused on the services sector has
come to be. The evidence picks up this change somehow, especially for our broad measures
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(tables A10 and A11). Nevertheless, o¤shoring intensity has increased independently of the
sector, so it does not appear that o¤shoring in the services sector had proportionally gained
much terrain.
The next point deals with the di¤erent kinds of o¤shoring. Naturally, this relates with
the previous point. In terms of the indices here presented, we are now interested in the type
of input being imported whereas, previously, we inquired about the destiny of the same
input. However, here the growth rate of the world (weighted) average seems signicantly
higher for services o¤shoring (table A12).
We therefore need to take a closer look at services o¤shoring. For this we present a
breakdown of the industries, noticing that in e¤ect services o¤shoring concentrates in ser-
vices industries (table A13). Moreover, industries at the top traditionally imply a relatively
high value added that could eventually transform in growth and employment. In turn,
we show the growth rates in the services o¤shoring intensities for every industry consid-
ered with their associated growth rates of employment (table A14 and gure A1). Not
surprisingly, fast growing industries like "Finance and insurance", "Computer and related
activities", or "Other business activities", experience high rates of both services o¤shoring
and employment.
As a concluding exercise, we carry out a decomposition analysis on the reviewed indices
that suggests a certain preference in their use (tables A15 to A17). In particular, broad
measures perform better than narrow ones. On this account, we can recommend the use of
any of the broad measures here discussed, which provide with a close approximation to the
true nature of o¤shoring on highly aggregate data.
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A Appendix: Tables
Table A1: Imported inputs in total inputs. Narrow measure (%)
World rank (selected countries)
Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2005
1 Luxemburg 21.59 1 Luxemburg 31.55 1 Luxemburg 31.70
2 Ireland 12.53 2 Ireland 15.84 2 Hungary 13.46
3 Hungary 11.25 3 Hungary 12.99 3 Czech Republic 10.53
4 Belgium 10.76 4 Belgium 12.39 4 Estonia 10.48
5 Slovak Republic 8.57 5 Slovak Republic 11.35 5 Slovenia 10.19
6 Estonia 8.22 6 Estonia 11.26 6 Netherlands 9.63
7 Taiwan 7.97 7 Slovenia 10.50 7 Belgium 8.42
8 Austria 7.73 8 Czech Republic 10.34 8 Austria 7.59
9 Canada 7.67 9 Austria 9.42 9 Germany 7.43
10 Netherlands 7.28 10 Canada 7.52 10 Finland 6.01
11 Portugal 5.40 11 Taiwan 7.51 11 Mexico 5.95
12 Israel 5.33 12 Netherlands 7.49 12 Sweden 5.55
13 Germany 5.11 13 Germany 6.66 13 Portugal 5.11
14 Sweden 5.07 14 South Korea 6.61 14 Indonesia 4.74
15 Finland 4.93 15 Spain 5.97 15 Poland 4.48
16 Spain 4.53 16 Switzerland 5.95 16 Denmark 4.42
17 Denmark 4.46 17 Portugal 5.62 17 China 4.00
18 Russia 4.35 18 Sweden 5.50 18 Spain 3.60
19 UK 4.33 19 Finland 5.42 19 France 3.33
20 Italy 4.23 20 Turkey 4.65 20 UK 3.27
21 Turkey 4.01 21 Denmark 4.54 21 Italy 2.90
22 Indonesia 3.99 22 Poland 4.53 22 Greece 2.52
23 France 3.89 23 Indonesia 4.53 23 Brazil 2.33
24 New Zealand 3.44 24 Russia 4.42 24 US 1.81
25 Norway 3.13 25 Italy 4.17 25 Japan 1.81
26 Argentina 2.98 26 UK 3.57 26 Australia 1.65
27 Greece 2.75 27 France 3.39 27 Argentina na
28 Poland 2.48 28 Norway 3.09 28 Canada na
29 China 2.36 29 South Africa 2.85 29 India na
30 Brazil 2.19 30 Greece 2.72 30 Ireland na
31 Japan 1.90 31 China 2.64 31 Israel na
32 South Africa 1.81 32 New Zealand 2.57 32 New Zealand na
33 US 1.47 33 Australia 2.42 33 Norway na
34 India 1.47 34 US 1.85 34 Russia na
35 Australia na 35 Japan 1.84 35 Slovak Republic na
36 Czech Republic na 36 Brazil 1.68 36 South Africa na
37 Mexico na 37 India 1.26 37 South Korea na
38 Slovenia na 38 Argentina na 38 Switzerland na
39 South Korea na 39 Israel na 39 Taiwan na
40 Switzerland na 40 Mexico na 40 Turkey na
w. mean 3.06 3.39 3.41
change (%) 10.79 0.45
*: formula (4a), weighted avg. across all industries by industry (gross) output, 8 i = j.
Note: nanot considered for the weighted mean, so all data in the last rows are comparable.
Sources (tables 1 to 17): authorscalculations based on OECD I-O database, 2009.
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Table A2: Imported inputs in total inputs. Broad measure (%)
World rank (selected countries)
Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2005
1 Ireland 48.50 1 Luxemburg 53.30 1 Luxemburg 57.33
2 Luxemburg 46.74 2 Ireland 52.64 2 Estonia 38.16
3 Estonia 37.29 3 Hungary 39.73 3 Hungary 37.47
4 Hungary 32.66 4 Estonia 37.99 4 Slovenia 34.57
5 Slovak Republic 27.76 5 Slovak Republic 34.18 5 Belgium 31.74
6 Belgium 27.27 6 Czech Republic 31.18 6 Czech Republic 31.60
7 Netherlands 25.73 7 Belgium 30.73 7 Austria 29.20
8 Taiwan 24.56 8 Slovenia 29.27 8 Netherlands 27.16
9 Austria 24.10 9 Austria 26.92 9 Sweden 25.36
10 Sweden 21.96 10 Netherlands 26.56 10 Denmark 25.06
11 Norway 21.58 11 Taiwan 24.46 11 Finland 23.61
12 Portugal 20.31 12 Sweden 24.38 12 Greece 23.61
13 Canada 20.15 13 Greece 23.26 13 Portugal 22.11
14 Denmark 19.63 14 Canada 23.05 14 Mexico 21.73
15 Greece 18.81 15 Portugal 21.86 15 Poland 20.45
16 Finland 17.69 16 Finland 21.79 16 Indonesia 19.50
17 Indonesia 17.66 17 Norway 20.76 17 Germany 19.21
18 UK 17.21 18 South Korea 19.83 18 Spain 18.77
19 Turkey 15.59 19 Denmark 19.83 19 France 16.03
20 Italy 15.00 20 Switzerland 19.24 20 UK 14.94
21 Spain 14.89 21 Spain 19.17 21 Italy 14.22
22 Russia 14.49 22 Indonesia 19.15 22 China 13.36
23 New Zealand 14.28 23 Germany 17.95 23 Australia 11.24
24 France 14.18 24 Turkey 17.27 24 Brazil 8.96
25 Germany 13.55 25 Poland 16.98 25 Japan 8.80
26 Poland 13.12 26 Italy 15.80 26 US 8.48
27 Israel 12.28 27 UK 15.56 27 Argentina na
28 South Africa 9.99 28 Russia 15.51 28 Canada na
29 India 9.15 29 New Zealand 15.22 29 India na
30 China 8.64 30 South Africa 14.58 30 Ireland na
31 Argentina 7.98 31 France 12.51 31 Israel na
32 Brazil 6.80 32 Australia 12.47 32 New Zealand na
33 Japan 5.78 33 India 10.73 33 Norway na
34 US 5.46 34 China 9.32 34 Russia na
35 Australia na 35 Brazil 9.00 35 Slovak Republic na
36 Czech Republic na 36 US 7.40 36 South Africa na
37 Mexico na 37 Japan 5.79 37 South Korea na
38 Slovenia na 38 Argentina na 38 Switzerland na
39 South Korea na 39 Israel na 39 Taiwan na
40 Switzerland na 40 Mexico na 40 Turkey na
w. mean 10.56 12.00 13.48
change (%) 13.65 12.30
*: formula (4a), weighted avg. across all industries by industry (gross) output.
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Table A3: Imported inputs in gross output. Narrow measure (%)
World rank (selected countries)
Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2005
1 Luxemburg 13.16 1 Luxemburg 23.91 1 Luxemburg 23.88
2 Ireland 8.13 2 Ireland 9.91 2 Hungary 9.62
3 Hungary 7.50 3 Hungary 9.65 3 Czech Republic 7.78
4 Belgium 7.27 4 Belgium 8.72 4 Estonia 7.71
5 Estonia 5.74 5 Estonia 8.56 5 Slovenia 6.68
6 Canada 5.48 6 Slovak Republic 7.71 6 Belgium 5.80
7 Slovak Republic 5.11 7 Czech Republic 7.22 7 Netherlands 5.26
8 Taiwan 5.07 8 Slovenia 7.04 8 Austria 4.39
9 Netherlands 4.31 9 Austria 5.35 9 Mexico 4.06
10 Austria 3.95 10 Taiwan 5.09 10 Germany 4.05
11 Portugal 3.43 11 Canada 4.87 11 Finland 3.96
12 Sweden 3.28 12 Netherlands 4.53 12 Sweden 3.57
13 Finland 3.15 13 South Korea 4.49 13 Portugal 3.26
14 Israel 2.95 14 Spain 3.92 14 Poland 3.03
15 Spain 2.86 15 Germany 3.72 15 China 2.99
16 Germany 2.73 16 Finland 3.64 16 Denmark 2.43
17 Italy 2.62 17 Portugal 3.63 17 Indonesia 2.42
18 UK 2.56 18 Sweden 3.63 18 Spain 2.31
19 Denmark 2.49 19 Switzerland 3.27 19 France 2.20
20 Indonesia 2.40 20 Poland 2.85 20 UK 1.87
21 France 2.38 21 Italy 2.71 21 Italy 1.85
22 Russia 2.31 22 Denmark 2.56 22 Brazil 1.36
23 Turkey 2.05 23 Turkey 2.49 23 Greece 1.30
24 Norway 2.00 24 Indonesia 2.45 24 Japan 1.19
25 New Zealand 1.99 25 Russia 2.41 25 US 1.11
26 Argentina 1.74 26 France 2.20 26 Australia 1.01
27 China 1.62 27 UK 2.07 27 Argentina na
28 Greece 1.55 28 Norway 1.98 28 Canada na
29 Poland 1.42 29 South Africa 1.84 29 India na
30 Brazil 1.16 30 China 1.83 30 Ireland na
31 South Africa 1.15 31 New Zealand 1.55 31 Israel na
32 Japan 1.04 32 Australia 1.50 32 New Zealand na
33 US 0.89 33 Greece 1.40 33 Norway na
34 India 0.88 34 US 1.15 34 Russia na
35 Australia na 35 Japan 1.08 35 Slovak Republic na
36 Czech Republic na 36 Brazil 0.95 36 South Africa na
37 Mexico na 37 India 0.74 37 South Korea na
38 Slovenia na 38 Argentina na 38 Switzerland na
39 South Korea na 39 Israel na 39 Taiwan na
40 Switzerland na 40 Mexico na 40 Turkey na
w. mean 1.83 2.11 2.12
change (%) 15.3 0.47
*: formula (4b), weighted avg. across all industries by industry (gross) output, 8 i = j.
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Table A4: Imported inputs in gross output. Broad measure (%)
World rank (selected countries)
Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2005
1 Ireland 26.73 1 Luxemburg 34.46 1 Luxemburg 37.14
2 Luxemburg 24.26 2 Ireland 30.94 2 Hungary 24.35
3 Estonia 23.13 3 Hungary 26.95 3 Estonia 24.00
4 Hungary 19.56 4 Estonia 24.61 4 Czech Republic 20.75
5 Belgium 16.78 5 Slovak Republic 22.42 5 Slovenia 20.04
6 Slovak Republic 15.76 6 Belgium 20.16 6 Belgium 19.20
7 Netherlands 14.23 7 Czech Republic 20.03 7 Netherlands 15.00
8 Taiwan 14.21 8 Slovenia 17.97 8 Austria 14.64
9 Canada 12.42 9 Netherlands 15.45 9 Sweden 14.06
10 Sweden 11.70 10 Taiwan 14.57 10 Denmark 13.55
11 Austria 11.52 11 Austria 14.22 11 Finland 13.45
12 Portugal 11.09 12 South Korea 13.61 12 Portugal 11.97
13 Norway 11.07 13 Sweden 13.55 13 Poland 11.38
14 Finland 10.13 14 Canada 12.78 14 Mexico 11.37
15 Denmark 9.69 15 Finland 12.74 15 Germany 10.52
16 UK 8.82 16 Portugal 12.09 16 Greece 10.31
17 Greece 8.46 17 Spain 11.26 17 Indonesia 9.97
18 Indonesia 8.35 18 Indonesia 10.31 18 Spain 9.94
19 Italy 8.35 19 Norway 10.22 19 China 8.90
20 Spain 8.25 20 Denmark 10.03 20 France 8.74
21 New Zealand 7.87 21 Switzerland 9.77 21 Italy 7.97
22 France 7.27 22 Germany 9.73 22 UK 7.78
23 Turkey 7.25 23 Poland 9.72 23 Australia 5.98
24 Israel 7.25 24 Italy 9.26 24 Japan 5.04
25 Germany 7.14 25 Greece 9.18 25 Brazil 4.71
26 Poland 7.02 26 New Zealand 8.22 26 US 4.44
27 Russia 6.32 27 UK 8.20 27 Argentina na
28 China 5.38 28 Turkey 7.78 28 Canada na
29 South Africa 4.98 29 Russia 7.09 29 India na
30 India 4.40 30 South Africa 6.98 30 Ireland na
31 Argentina 4.14 31 France 6.85 31 Israel na
32 Brazil 3.38 32 Australia 6.38 32 New Zealand na
33 Japan 2.92 33 China 6.12 33 Norway na
34 US 2.78 34 India 5.18 34 Russia na
35 Australia na 35 Brazil 4.31 35 Slovak Republic na
36 Czech Republic na 36 US 3.87 36 South Africa na
37 Mexico na 37 Japan 3.35 37 South Korea na
38 Slovenia na 38 Argentina na 38 Switzerland na
39 South Korea na 39 Israel na 39 Taiwan na
40 Switzerland na 40 Mexico na 40 Turkey na
w. mean 11.25 13.40 14.94
change (%) 19.08 11.52
*: formula (4b), weighted avg. across all industries by industry (gross) output.
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Table A5: Vertical specialization index. Narrow measure (%)
World rank (selected countries)
Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2005
1 Luxemburg 21.24 1 Luxemburg 33.56 1 Luxemburg 32.47
2 Hungary 20.46 2 Estonia 23.29 2 Hungary 22.98
3 Ireland 16.41 3 Hungary 22.59 3 Estonia 18.71
4 Belgium 15.97 4 Belgium 17.89 4 Czech Republic 17.99
5 Canada 13.40 5 Ireland 17.09 5 Slovenia 15.55
6 Estonia 12.39 6 Slovenia 16.89 6 Mexico 15.48
7 Austria 11.49 7 Slovak Republic 16.57 7 Belgium 11.51
8 Portugal 9.31 8 Czech Republic 14.10 8 Finland 11.36
9 Taiwan 9.16 9 Austria 13.82 9 Portugal 10.69
10 Spain 8.83 10 Canada 12.56 10 Austria 10.02
11 Slovak Republic 8.74 11 Spain 11.24 11 Netherlands 9.52
12 Sweden 8.74 12 Portugal 11.03 12 China 8.20
13 Netherlands 8.61 13 Taiwan 9.95 13 Sweden 8.19
14 Finland 7.78 14 Finland 8.98 14 Germany 7.90
15 UK 6.52 15 South Korea 8.97 15 Poland 7.66
16 Germany 6.34 16 Netherlands 8.90 16 Spain 7.39
17 Israel 6.34 17 Sweden 8.78 17 France 6.20
18 France 6.10 18 Germany 7.81 18 UK 5.70
19 Denmark 5.08 19 Poland 6.43 19 Denmark 4.92
20 Italy 5.08 20 UK 6.23 20 Italy 4.84
21 Argentina 4.17 21 Italy 6.05 21 Japan 4.28
22 Indonesia 4.14 22 Switzerland 5.76 22 Indonesia 3.78
23 Norway 4.10 23 France 5.57 23 US 3.37
24 China 3.70 24 Denmark 4.98 24 Greece 3.08
25 Russia 3.29 25 Indonesia 4.75 25 Brazil 2.86
26 New Zealand 3.16 26 Turkey 4.05 26 Australia 1.55
27 Turkey 3.00 27 US 3.71 27 Argentina na
28 Japan 2.83 28 Japan 3.51 28 Canada na
29 Greece 2.81 29 China 3.42 29 India na
30 US 2.46 30 Norway 3.21 30 Ireland na
31 Brazil 2.10 31 Russia 3.04 31 Israel na
32 Poland 2.06 32 New Zealand 2.88 32 New Zealand na
33 India 1.31 33 Brazil 2.70 33 Norway na
34 South Africa 1.04 34 Australia 2.25 34 Russia na
35 Australia na 35 Greece 2.19 35 Slovak Republic na
36 Czech Republic na 36 South Africa 2.04 36 South Africa na
37 Mexico na 37 India 1.22 37 South Korea na
38 Slovenia na 38 Argentina na 38 Switzerland na
39 South Korea na 39 Israel na 39 Taiwan na
40 Switzerland na 40 Mexico na 40 Turkey na
w. mean 4.47 5.32 5.51
change (%) 19.07 3.63
*: formula (4b), weighted avg. across all industries by industrys share in total exports, 8 i = j.
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Table A6: Vertical specialization index. Broad measure (%)
World rank (selected countries)
Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2005
1 Hungary 40.07 1 Hungary 51.09 1 Hungary 48.37
2 Ireland 40.03 2 Ireland 48.15 2 Luxemburg 44.40
3 Estonia 34.83 3 Estonia 46.42 3 Estonia 41.65
4 Luxemburg 31.39 4 Luxemburg 42.52 4 Slovenia 35.95
5 Belgium 29.65 5 Slovak Republic 39.83 5 Czech Republic 35.26
6 Netherlands 24.33 6 Slovenia 34.02 6 Mexico 32.25
7 Taiwan 23.44 7 Belgium 33.67 7 Belgium 28.18
8 Austria 22.91 8 Czech Republic 32.95 8 Denmark 27.62
9 Slovak Republic 21.95 9 Netherlands 26.91 9 Finland 25.94
10 Canada 21.11 10 Austria 26.90 10 Netherlands 25.48
11 Sweden 21.00 11 South Korea 25.64 11 Sweden 23.99
12 Finland 18.86 12 Taiwan 24.88 12 Greece 23.55
13 Portugal 18.59 13 Spain 23.87 13 Austria 23.18
14 Spain 17.98 14 Sweden 23.60 14 Portugal 22.32
15 Norway 17.04 15 Canada 23.57 15 Germany 18.62
16 Israel 16.21 16 Finland 22.23 16 Poland 18.59
17 Denmark 15.98 17 Portugal 21.57 17 Spain 17.35
18 UK 15.17 18 Germany 17.53 18 France 16.14
19 Germany 13.90 19 Poland 16.05 19 China 14.30
20 Italy 13.74 20 Italy 15.85 20 Italy 13.44
21 France 12.70 21 Denmark 14.93 21 UK 13.16
22 Greece 10.41 22 UK 14.42 22 Indonesia 12.45
23 Indonesia 10.25 23 Switzerland 14.15 23 Japan 8.71
24 New Zealand 9.99 24 Indonesia 13.74 24 Australia 8.00
25 Poland 8.59 25 Norway 13.56 25 US 7.78
26 Argentina 8.00 26 France 12.10 26 Brazil 7.53
27 China 7.68 27 New Zealand 10.34 27 Argentina na
28 Turkey 7.68 28 Greece 10.12 28 Canada na
29 Russia 6.36 29 China 9.75 29 India na
30 India 5.78 30 Turkey 9.56 30 Ireland na
31 South Africa 5.71 31 South Africa 9.06 31 Israel na
32 Brazil 5.62 32 Australia 8.58 32 New Zealand na
33 US 5.27 33 India 7.55 33 Norway na
34 Japan 4.91 34 US 7.25 34 Russia na
35 Australia na 35 Brazil 6.61 35 Slovak Republic na
36 Czech Republic na 36 Russia 6.51 36 South Africa na
37 Mexico na 37 Japan 5.74 37 South Korea na
38 Slovenia na 38 Argentina na 38 Switzerland na
39 South Korea na 39 Israel na 39 Taiwan na
40 Switzerland na 40 Mexico na 40 Turkey na
w. mean 19.69 23.58 25.67
change (%) 19.73 8.87
*: formula (4b), weighted avg. across all industries by industrys share in total exports.
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Table A7: Imported inputs in total inputs, growth
Top ten
Narrow: Broad:
change (%) 1995-2000 change (%) 2000-2005 change (%) 1995-2000 change (%) 2000-2005
1 Poland 82.93 1 China 51.67 1 South Africa 45.94 1 Japan 52.05
2 South Africa 57.12 2 Brazil 38.97 2 US 35.53 2 China 43.36
3 Luxemburg 46.18 3 Netherlands 28.52 3 Germany 32.46 3 France 28.17
4 Estonia 36.98 4 Germany 11.56 4 Brazil 32.26 4 Denmark 26.38
5 Slovak Republic 32.42 5 Finland 10.94 5 Poland 29.38 5 Poland 20.42
6 Spain 31.70 6 Indonesia 4.82 6 Spain 28.70 6 Slovenia 18.10
7 Germany 30.21 7 Hungary 3.63 7 Greece 23.64 7 US 14.59
8 Ireland 26.42 8 Czech Republic 1.80 8 Finland 23.15 8 Austria 8.47
9 US 25.49 9 Sweden 0.91 9 Slovak Republic 23.10 9 Finland 8.36
10 Austria 21.83 10 Luxemburg 0.46 10 Hungary 21.62 10 Luxemburg 7.57
Table A8: Imported inputs in output, growth
Top ten
Narrow: Broad:
change (%) 1995-2000 change (%) 2000-2005 change (%) 1995-2000 change (%) 2000-2005
1 Poland 100.70 1 China 63.39 1 Slovak Republic 42.29 1 Japan 50.55
2 Luxemburg 81.69 2 Brazil 43.16 2 Luxemburg 42.03 2 China 45.45
3 South Africa 60.00 3 Netherlands 16.11 3 South Africa 40.06 3 Denmark 35.05
4 Slovak Republic 50.88 4 Japan 10.19 4 US 39.20 4 France 27.56
5 Estonia 49.13 5 Germany 8.87 5 Poland 38.46 5 Poland 17.07
6 Spain 37.06 6 Finland 8.79 6 Hungary 37.77 6 US 14.91
7 Germany 36.26 7 Czech Republic 7.76 7 Spain 36.56 7 Greece 12.21
8 Austria 35.44 8 Poland 6.32 8 Germany 36.25 8 Slovenia 11.54
9 US 29.21 9 France 0.00 9 Brazil 27.62 9 Brazil 9.21
10 Hungary 28.67 10 Luxemburg -0.13 10 Finland 25.82 10 Germany 8.10
Table A9: Vertical specialization index, growth
Top ten
Narrow: Broad:
change (%) 1995-2000 change (%) 2000-2005 change (%) 1995-2000 change (%) 2000-2005
1 Poland 212.14 1 China 139.79 1 Poland 86.85 1 Greece 132.74
2 South Africa 96.15 2 Greece 40.44 2 Slovak Republic 81.46 2 Denmark 85.03
3 Slovak Republic 89.59 3 Czech Republic 27.58 3 South Africa 58.67 3 Japan 51.74
4 Estonia 88.00 4 Finland 26.48 4 US 37.57 4 China 46.65
5 Luxemburg 58.00 5 Japan 21.83 5 Luxemburg 35.46 5 France 33.35
6 US 50.81 6 Poland 19.09 6 Indonesia 34.05 6 Finland 16.67
7 Turkey 35.00 7 France 11.32 7 Estonia 33.26 7 Poland 15.85
8 Brazil 28.57 8 Netherlands 6.93 8 Spain 32.76 8 Brazil 13.91
9 Spain 27.29 9 Brazil 5.85 9 India 30.62 9 US 7.34
10 Japan 24.03 10 Hungary 1.72 10 Hungary 27.50 10 Czech Republic 7.00
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Table A12: Materials and services o¤shoring, broad measure (%)
Materials offshoring Services offshoring nominal GDP (2008)
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 millions share (%)
Argentina 6.26 na na 0.93 na na 326,474 -
Australia na 9.25 8.29 na 2.28 1.63 1,010,699 -
Austria 17.03 18.66 18.46 4.81 5.43 6.72 415,321 0.96
Belgium 17.92 19.17 18.26 6.25 7.84 8.78 506,392 1.18
Brazil 4.35 5.62 5.05 1.28 2.29 2.32 1,572,839 3.65
Canada 14.80 17.06 na 4.12 4.44 na 1,510,957 -
China 7.62 7.79 9.77 0.18 0.33 1.22 4,401,614 10.22
Czech Republic na 20.95 24.37 na 6.29 3.71 217,077 -
Denmark 14.31 14.31 13.33 3.92 4.17 10.40 342,925 0.80
Estonia 28.53 28.43 28.57 6.40 7.27 7.37 23,232 0.05
Finland 11.55 14.59 15.05 3.97 4.24 5.06 273,980 0.64
France 10.39 8.84 10.88 2.33 1.64 3.04 2,865,737 6.65
Germany 9.11 11.23 11.56 3.04 4.77 4.96 3,667,513 8.52
Greece 15.30 14.55 14.43 1.31 4.50 6.14 357,549 0.83
Hungary 23.93 30.46 30.28 5.36 5.00 5.51 156,284 0.36
India 4.96 6.82 na 2.36 1.67 na 1,209,686 -
Indonesia 12.72 11.63 10.99 3.85 4.61 4.31 511,765 1.19
Ireland 28.65 25.70 na 18.67 25.84 na 273,328 -
Israel 7.53 na na 4.43 na na 201,761 -
Italy 9.57 13.19 8.75 3.23 4.96 2.94 2,313,893 5.37
Japan 2.79 3.07 4.80 1.36 1.25 1.11 4,923,761 11.43
Luxemburg 13.90 9.40 9.62 30.18 42.08 45.79 54,973 0.13
Mexico na na 15.87 na na 1.27 1,088,128 -
Netherlands 16.62 15.94 12.44 5.85 6.51 9.72 868,940 2.02
New Zealand 10.29 10.10 na 2.75 3.19 na 128,492 -
Norway 14.16 12.41 na 6.48 7.65 na 456,226 -
Poland 9.35 12.17 15.70 1.32 2.12 2.05 525,735 1.22
Portugal 13.88 15.06 14.14 3.55 3.38 3.69 244,492 0.57
Russia 11.05 11.92 na 2.24 2.60 na 1,676,586 -
Slovak Republic 14.98 21.72 na 5.76 4.45 na 95,404 -
Slovenia na 24.35 27.43 na 2.99 4.55 54,639 -
South Africa 7.00 10.48 na 1.34 2.79 na 277,188 -
South Korea na 12.49 na na 3.09 na 947,010 -
Spain 10.33 12.86 12.00 2.41 3.65 4.39 1,611,767 3.74
Sweden 16.05 16.66 15.91 4.53 5.85 7.41 484,550 1.13
Switzerland na 11.75 na na 5.29 na 492,595 -
Taiwan 15.49 16.87 na 5.94 4.13 na 392,552 -
Turkey 9.65 11.41 na 1.39 2.23 na 729,443 -
UK 12.42 15.20 9.83 3.36 4.39 3.74 2,674,085 6.21
US 4.84 5.82 6.18 0.22 0.38 0.47 14,264,600 33.13
43,061,947 100
Weighted mean 7.67 8.71 8.70 1.68 2.19 2.46
*: formula (4a), but the origin of the imported inputs (mjt) is restricted to the manufacturing
and services sectors, according to the classication in A10. See Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006).
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Table A15: Decomposition analysis, imported inputs in inputs, 1995-2005
MII (Narrow) MII (Broad)
within between total w / tot (%) within between total w / tot (%)
Argentina** na na
Australia* -0.4276 -0.3376 -0.7651 56 -0.8891 -0.3338 -1.2230 73
Austria -0.9305 0.7880 -0.1425 653 4.2530 0.8466 5.0996 83
Belgium -2.0097 -0.3335 -2.3431 86 4.3946 0.0660 4.4606 99
Brazil -0.2141 0.3605 0.1464 -146 1.2409 0.9114 2.1523 58
Canada* -0.0544 -0.0915 -0.1459 37 3.2453 -0.3440 2.9013 112
China 0.9154 0.7297 1.6451 56 3.6969 1.0297 4.7266 78
Czech Republic* -0.2687 0.4525 0.1838 -146 -0.3707 0.7853 0.4146 -89
Denmark 0.2943 -0.3348 -0.0406 -725 4.9852 0.4417 5.4268 92
Estonia 1.9618 0.2952 2.2569 87 -0.1290 0.9988 0.8698 -15
Finland 0.6533 0.4242 1.0775 61 4.8929 1.0241 5.9170 83
France -0.2214 -0.3443 -0.5658 39 2.0910 -0.2401 1.8509 113
Germany 1.9204 0.3938 2.3141 83 4.9201 0.7441 5.6642 87
Greece 0.6144 -0.8429 -0.2285 -269 3.5248 1.2724 4.7972 73
Hungary 0.0946 2.1231 2.2176 4 2.2605 2.5452 4.8057 47
India* -0.1800 -0.0264 -0.2064 87 1.4969 0.0824 1.5794 95
Indonesia -0.0616 0.8150 0.7534 -8 -0.6053 2.4459 1.8405 -33
Ireland* 2.3752 0.9353 3.3105 72 2.5373 1.6003 4.1376 61
Israel** na na
Italy -0.8868 -0.4465 -1.3333 67 -0.3672 -0.4130 -0.7802 47
Japan -0.1413 0.0522 -0.0891 159 2.6292 0.3950 3.0242 87
Luxemburg 3.0790 7.0335 10.1125 30 8.2673 2.3283 10.5956 78
Mexico** na na
Netherlands 2.6726 -0.3182 2.3544 114 1.7583 -0.3303 1.4280 123
New Zealand* -0.8413 -0.0243 -0.8656 97 1.1078 -0.1722 0.9356 118
Norway* 0.3350 -0.3798 -0.0448 -748 -0.4192 -0.4071 -0.8263 51
Poland 2.4049 -0.4016 2.0032 120 8.2741 -0.9505 7.3235 113
Portugal 0.7931 -1.0879 -0.2948 -269 1.9661 -0.1669 1.7992 109
Russia* -0.1652 0.2373 0.0721 -229 1.3342 -0.3195 1.0147 131
Slovak Republic* 1.9885 0.7908 2.7793 72 4.9146 1.4976 6.4122 77
Slovenia* -0.1627 -0.1507 -0.3134 52 5.4632 -0.1662 5.2970 103
South Africa* 0.9699 0.0659 1.0358 94 4.6463 0.0572 4.7035 99
South Korea** na na
Spain -0.5092 -0.4192 -0.9284 55 4.3517 -0.4777 3.8740 112
Sweden 0.1288 0.3467 0.4754 27 1.6560 1.7443 3.4003 49
Switzerland** na na
Taiwan* -0.8291 0.3663 -0.4628 179 -1.2351 1.1401 -0.0950 1300
Turkey* 0.9940 -0.3493 0.6447 154 1.8832 -0.2004 1.6828 112
UK -0.0164 -1.0388 -1.0553 2 -0.7077 -1.5609 -2.2686 31
US 0.5042 -0.1644 0.3399 148 2.8364 0.1826 3.0190 94
Mean 4 Mean 110
Std. dv. 240 Std. dv. 212
Mean (no outliers. 1σ) 50 Mean (no outliers. 1σ) 75
Std. dv. (no outliers 1σ) 90 Std. dv. (no outliers 1σ) 46
*: data available for two years, **: data available for one year (analysis is not possible).
Note: mean values are (tables 17 to 19): the simple mean and the mean discarding outliers outside
the 1 range; percentages in the "within / total" column were rounded.
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Table A16: Decomposition analysis, imported inputs in gross output, 1995-2005
MIO (Narrow) MIO (Broad)
within between total w / tot (%) within between total w / tot (%)
Argentina** na na
Australia* -0.2672 -0.2160 -0.4832 55 -0.1796 -0.2156 -0.3952 45
Austria -0.0429 0.4883 0.4453 -10 2.5112 0.6095 3.1208 80
Belgium -1.1745 -0.2959 -1.4704 80 2.2255 0.1928 2.4183 92
Brazil 0.0644 0.1312 0.1956 33 0.8897 0.4413 1.3310 67
Canada* -0.2977 -0.3082 -0.6059 49 1.0678 -0.7065 0.3613 296
China 0.7355 0.6363 1.3718 54 2.6370 0.8762 3.5132 75
Czech Republic* 0.0871 0.4709 0.5580 16 -0.3193 1.0384 0.7191 -44
Denmark 0.1768 -0.2437 -0.0670 -264 3.7374 0.1176 3.8550 97
Estonia 1.5938 0.3710 1.9647 81 -0.1055 0.9811 0.8756 -12
Finland 0.5196 0.2819 0.8015 65 2.5917 0.7332 3.3249 78
France 0.0474 -0.2301 -0.1828 -26 1.6425 -0.1701 1.4725 112
Germany 1.0697 0.2506 1.3203 81 2.7496 0.6273 3.3770 81
Greece 0.2000 -0.4566 -0.2567 -78 1.1283 0.7172 1.8456 61
Hungary 0.4385 1.6879 2.1264 21 2.7318 2.0631 4.7949 57
India* -0.1195 -0.0208 -0.1403 85 0.7070 0.0808 0.7878 90
Indonesia -0.4470 0.4611 0.0141 -3172 0.2209 1.3942 1.6151 14
Ireland* 1.2567 0.5220 1.7787 71 3.3005 0.9050 4.2056 78
Israel** na na
Italy -0.4576 -0.3142 -0.7717 59 0.0495 -0.4254 -0.3760 -13
Japan 0.1187 0.0346 0.1532 77 1.8999 0.2158 2.1156 90
Luxemburg 5.5735 5.1407 10.7142 52 9.7033 3.1731 12.8765 75
Mexico** na na
Netherlands 1.3288 -0.3841 0.9447 141 1.1652 -0.3984 0.7668 152
New Zealand* -0.3961 -0.0455 -0.4416 90 0.6338 -0.2869 0.3469 183
Norway* 0.2409 -0.2540 -0.0131 -1839 -0.2645 -0.5874 -0.8519 31
Poland 1.7977 -0.1880 1.6097 112 4.8272 -0.4694 4.3577 111
Portugal 0.5271 -0.6944 -0.1673 -315 1.0612 -0.1807 0.8805 121
Russia* 0.0292 0.0676 0.0968 30 0.9907 -0.2290 0.7617 130
Slovak Republic* 1.8324 0.7706 2.6030 70 5.2555 1.4077 6.6632 79
Slovenia* -0.2289 -0.1350 -0.3639 63 2.2372 -0.1639 2.0733 108
South Africa* 0.6685 0.0272 0.6957 96 2.0515 -0.0553 1.9962 103
South Korea** na na
Spain -0.2193 -0.3349 -0.5542 40 2.0372 -0.3398 1.6975 120
Sweden 0.1161 0.1748 0.2909 40 1.2758 1.0856 2.3615 54
Switzerland** na na
Taiwan* -0.1619 0.1850 0.0231 -701 -0.2897 0.6420 0.3523 -82
Turkey* 0.6287 -0.1877 0.4410 143 0.6018 -0.0742 0.5276 114
UK -0.0240 -0.6698 -0.6938 3 0.0905 -1.1268 -1.0363 -9
US 0.3110 -0.0942 0.2169 143 1.5500 0.1156 1.6656 93
Mean -130 Mean 78
Std. dv. 634 Std. dv. 66
Mean (no outliers. 1σ) 14 Mean (no outliers. 1σ) 84
Std. dv. (no outliers 1σ) 160 Std. dv. (no outliers 1σ) 28
*: data available for two years, **: data available for one year (analysis is not possible).
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Table A17: Decomposition analysis, vertical specialization index, 1995-2005
VS (Narrow) VS (Broad)
within between total w / tot (%) within between total w / tot (%)
Argentina** na na
Australia* -0.5108 -0.1905 -0.7013 73 -0.6594 0.0751 -0.5844 113
Austria -0.0453 -1.4306 -1.4759 3 2.1175 -1.8478 0.2697 785
Belgium -2.2944 -2.1671 -4.4615 51 0.7353 -2.2069 -1.4715 -50
Brazil 0.5007 0.2532 0.7539 66 1.4871 0.4190 1.9060 78
Canada* 0.4811 -1.3220 -0.8409 -57 3.6740 -1.2130 2.4610 149
China 2.9832 3.5949 6.5781 45 5.0992 3.8155 8.9147 57
Czech Republic* 1.2764 2.6085 3.8849 33 -2.6268 4.9281 2.3013 -114
Denmark 0.3208 -0.4816 -0.1608 -200 10.8362 0.8056 11.6418 93
Estonia 3.5333 2.7930 6.3262 56 2.1908 4.6265 6.8172 32
Finland 1.1170 2.4645 3.5815 31 3.0967 3.9795 7.0762 44
France 0.2772 -0.1769 0.1003 276 2.7779 0.6595 3.4374 81
Germany 1.8038 -0.2454 1.5584 116 4.2324 0.4893 4.7217 90
Greece 0.5575 -0.2882 0.2693 207 6.8463 6.2969 13.1432 52
Hungary -0.4698 2.9915 2.5216 -19 5.6152 2.6838 8.2990 68
India* -0.2771 0.1931 -0.0840 330 1.8100 -0.0452 1.7648 103
Indonesia -0.8917 0.5330 -0.3587 249 0.0956 2.1048 2.2003 4
Ireland* 0.9677 -0.2887 0.6790 143 8.3549 -0.2379 8.1170 103
Israel** na na
Italy -0.5799 0.3443 -0.2356 246 -1.3823 1.0836 -0.2987 463
Japan 1.2546 0.1892 1.4438 87 4.0419 -0.2432 3.7987 106
Luxemburg 8.1131 3.1232 11.2363 72 11.5174 1.4987 13.0161 88
Mexico** na na
Netherlands 1.9126 -1.0023 0.9103 210 1.5954 -0.4441 1.1513 139
New Zealand* -0.4736 0.1910 -0.2826 168 0.2953 0.0549 0.3502 84
Norway* 0.3226 -1.2092 -0.8866 -36 0.1486 -3.6288 -3.4802 -4
Poland 4.6428 0.9592 5.6019 83 8.8862 1.1156 10.0018 89
Portugal 1.1508 0.2301 1.3808 83 2.3076 1.4303 3.7379 62
Russia* 0.2678 -0.5154 -0.2476 -108 0.9281 -0.7812 0.1469 632
Slovak Republic* 3.7937 4.0369 7.8306 48 10.9572 6.9237 17.8809 61
Slovenia* -0.9836 -0.3576 -1.3413 73 2.6694 -0.7388 1.9306 138
South Africa* 0.6078 0.3944 1.0022 61 3.0844 0.2665 3.3509 92
South Korea** na na
Spain -0.2415 -1.2003 -1.4418 17 1.1465 -1.7745 -0.6280 -183
Sweden -0.3771 -0.1786 -0.5557 68 1.5458 1.4426 2.9884 52
Switzerland** na na
Taiwan* -0.0300 0.8174 0.7874 -4 -0.2774 1.7220 1.4446 -19
Turkey* 1.6307 -0.5740 1.0567 154 1.8637 0.0141 1.8778 99
UK 0.4444 -1.2659 -0.8215 -54 0.2490 -2.2562 -2.0072 -12
US 0.5739 0.3364 0.9102 63 1.6329 0.8781 2.5110 65
Mean 75 Mean 104
Std. dv. 110 Std. dv. 180
Mean (no outliers. 1σ) 66 Mean (no outliers. 1σ) 69
Std. dv. (no outliers 1σ) 46 Std. dv. (no outliers 1σ) 48
*: data available for two years, **: data available for one year (analysis is not possible).
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Figure A1: Services o¤shoring and employment growth worldwide,
1995-2000
Note: weighted values across industries worldwide. Three outliers removed (2 range).
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